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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
LIBEL-EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY-SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY BROADLY INTERPRETED
The Attorney General of Pennsylvania sent a letter to thedistrict attorney of Allegheny County in which he .listed com-munistic activities of plaintiff, an assistant district attorney, and
demanded her dismissal. In a suit against the Attorney General
for libel, it was held (3-2): since the Attorney General was acting
within the scope of his authority, he possessed an absolute priv-
ilege, conferring complete immunity from civil actions for libel.
The dissent, relying on a prior decision that the Attorney General
was powerless to discharge an assistant district attorney, con-
tended that such a communication was outside the scope of the
former's authority, leaving him only a conditional immunity whichwould not bar the present action. Matson v. Margiotti, - Pa.
88 A. 2d 892 (1952).
In an action of libel two principal defenses are available tothe defendant. He may plead truNh, astle v. Houston, 19 Kan.
417 (1877), or privilege, Israel v. Portland News Pub. Co., 152 Ore.
225, 53 P. 2d 529 (1936).
Originally, absolute privilege extended only to legislative pro-ceedings, Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808), judicial proceedings,
Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220 (1868), and communications
between the military, Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94
(1869). It was not until 1896 that this immunity was extended tothe executive branch. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896). Inthat case, the Postmaster General had sent letters containing the
alleged libel to various postmasters. The Court declared at p. 498:
We are of opinion that the same general considerations ofpublic policy and convenience which demand for judges of
courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for
damages arising from acts done by them in the course of their
judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communica-
tions made by the heads of executive departments when en-
gaged in discharge of duties imposed upon them by law.
It is not completely clear which executive officers possess abso-lute immunity. It clearly extends to the major officers of execu-tive departments. Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. 2d 168 (D. C. Cir. 1927)
(cabinet officer); De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D. C. 167
(1904) (chief of War Department record and pension office);
Parr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413 (1912) (commissioner of
Indian affairs); United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick,
69 F. 2d 383 (D. 01. Cir. 1934) (consul); Harwood v. McMurty, 22F. Supp. 572 (W. D. Ky. 1938) (Internal Revenue Agent). Lesser
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officers have not been granted this absolute immunity. Peterson
v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N. W. 147 (1910) (postmaster);
Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 34 N. E. 242 (1893) (principal of
state institution for deaf mutes) ; Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 293,
70 Atl. 1035 (1908) (superintendent of public schools); Ranson v.
West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S, W. 885 (1907) (county school trustees).
* Having absolute 'privilege or immunity, the party is protected
even where his statements are maliciously made. Spalding v.
Filas, supra; De Arnaud v. Ainsworthy, supra; Glass v. Ickes,
117 F. 2d 273 (D. C. Cir. 1940). But, when a party otherwise
having an absolute privilege acts beyond the scope of his authority,
this absolute privilege is lost and such officer is entitled only to a
conditional privilege. Harwood v. McMurty, supra. In such a
situation, when libel is established the burden is placed on the
defendant to show that the communication was made in good faith
in the discharge of a legal or moral duty. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Yount, 66 F. 2d 700 (8th Cir. 1933). And the condi-
tional immunity is inapplicable where the libel is malicious. Bause-
wine v. Norristown Herald, 351 Pa. 634, 41 A. 2d 736 (1945).
In the ingtant case the court held that the Attorney General
had an absolute privilege on the premise that he is vested with the
broad powers )f the Attorney General at common law. Common-
wealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17,188 AitL 524 (1936).
He acts within the scope of his authority when informing a district
attorney of the character of any of his assistants; therefore, even
though this libel be maliciously made, the Attorney General is
immune from suit. However, approximately one year prior to
this case, the same court reviewed an injunction granted to the
same assistant district attorney against this same Attorney Gen-
eral to prohibit the latter from holding a public hearing into the
alleged communistic background of the plaintiff. The court upheld
the injunction on the ground that the Attorney General had no
power to discharge or compel the discharge of an assistant district
attorney; therefore, the Attorney General was powerless to con-
duct the hearing. Matson v. Jackson, 368 Pa. 2?83, 83 A. 2d 134
(1951). Thus, it appears that the court gave a broader inter-
pretation to defendant's authority in dealing with executive im-
munity in a libel suit than it did in deciding the power of this
Attorney General to conduct a specific proceeding.
The important role of executive immunity is accentuated by
the accusations of communistic affiliations daily coming before the
public. Certainly every individual desires protection from ma-
licious actions by public officials. It can be strongly argued that
a conditional privilege is sufficient protection for an executive
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officer. This conditional privilege would protect him as long as
his remarks are made on reasonable grounds. However, the whole
policy behind executive immunity is to allow the officer freedom of
action so that he will not be called to account for his every word.
It may be in the public interest to extend absolute immunity to
officers with investigative duties, in order to prevent the suppres-
sion of important information. As executive immunity is a crea-
tion of the courts, it is their delicate task to balance these various
considerations of personal freedom and public security.
Frank J. Laski
TORTS-UNEMANCIPATED MINOR ALLOWED TORT
ACTION AGAINST PARENT FOR NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff, an unemancipated minor child, sought damages for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of a partnership of
which plaintiff's father was a member. Held: A parent in his
business or vocational capacity is not immune from a personal
tort action by his unemancipated minor child. Signs v. Signs, 156
Ohio 566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (1952).
Various reasons have been assigned for disallowing tort ac-
tions between parent and minor child. The majority of American
courts which have denied the action have relied heavily on an
analogy to the policy considerations behind the common law
inter-spouse immunity, i. e., that such an action would disrupt the
peace and harmony of the home. Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div.
651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (3rd Dep't 1930) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131,
131 Atl. 198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787
(1929); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations,
13 H_Anv. L. REv. 1030 (1930); PROSSER, TORTS 901-3 (1941).
Other reasons advanced for denying the action are that such suits
would: (1) impair parental discipline, Matarese v. Matarese,
supra, Buchanon v. Buchanon, 170 Va. 458, 197 S. E. 426 (1938);
(2) deplete the family finances, Small v. Morrison, supra; Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) ; (3) encourage fraudu-
lent and collusive suits, Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E.
2d 438 (1938).
However, where there exists a relationship additional to that
of parent and child and the fact of parenthood is, under the cir-
cumstances, merely incidental, the minor has been permitted to
maintain the action. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905
(1930). Thus recovery has been allowed where the parties are
